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The Tonle Sap Lake, Cambodia: water-related
conflicts with abundance of water
Marko Keskinen, Mira Käkönen, Prom Tola, and Olli Varis
T
he past decade has seen increasing discussion on water-related conflicts, water
crises, and even water wars.  This discussion has ranged from possible types1
of water-related conflicts to their scales, with a heated debate on whether
conflicts will be more likely to occur within or between countries. There have also
been arguments that water conflicts are not so much about water per se, but about the
differences in values attached to water and related resources.2
In this article we analyze water-related tensions and conflicts within the Tonle Sap
Lake area of Cambodia. We do so with three case studies that focus on different kinds
of water uses. Revealing multiple dimensions and levels of water-related conflicts,
they indicate that as a source of tension and conflict, prevailing power structures –
which include informal and formal arrangements of resource access and use – are far
more important than the physical abundance of water itself.
Cambodia: a society in transition
Relatively rich in natural resources,  Cambodia is one of the poorest countries in Asia3
when measured in monetary terms: its GNI per capita in 2005 was estimated to be a
mere $380.  The majority of its population is deeply dependent on common natural4
resources for their livelihood, with rice and fish forming the most important livelihood
sources. Although the proportion of agriculture in GNI has been decreasing, over 70
percent of the labor force still works in the agricultural sector.5
Since the early 1990s, Cambodia has faced the challenges of multidimensional
transition, shifting from long years of war to peace, from single-party politics toward
democracy, and from command economy to market economy.  It has opened up to6
regional and global economics and politics, and the entire Mekong region has moved
toward closer cooperation, particularly in trade. Cambodian society has gone through
significant political changes, and the pursuit of participatory democracy has left its
mark. The results have often been mixed, and democratic processes currently overlap
with different kinds of patronage structures. These dynamic changes have resulted in
sociopolitical hybridization.7
While Cambodia’s economic growth has been relatively rapid, development has
been far from equal and the disparities keep growing particularly between urban and
rural areas.  Among the main challenges for equal development are weak and non-8
transparent governance; these also contribute to polarization of the society.  Political9
dominance of the ruling party and coalescence of bureaucratic, economic, and military
power have influenced natural resources management as, e.g., fish and forest
resources offer an easy income source for the well-connected elite.  Indeed, as noted10
by the World Bank, many of Cambodia’s development challenges are “fundamentally
about ‘governance,’ that is, how the rules, institutions, and systems of the state
operate and how the state relates to citizens, civil society and the private sector in
terms of transparency and accountability.”11
Cambodia’s formal governance system suffers from horizontal discontinuities. For
example, water-related issues are handled under several ministries with different
mandates, ambitions, and policies. Also troublesome are the functioning of vertical
links among central government, provincial and local authorities, and villages.
Consequently, on-going decentralization programs – including initiatives for
community-based natural resource management – aim at strengthening local level
governance, facilitating bottom-up processes and improving the two-way flow of
information along vertical links. An additional twist in Cambodia’s governance
system is its aid dependency and the relative dominance of donors and international
NGOs in shaping government policies and introducing new approaches such as
decentralization and participation.12
Tonle Sap Lake: a natural and hydrological wonder
The Tonle Sap Lake (Figure 1) and its resources form a central source of livelihoods
and food for well over one million people living in the lake are and its flood plains.13
However, Tonle Sap’s significance extends much further as it is estimated that half
of Cambodia’s population benefits directly or indirectly from the lake’s resources.14
Despite the relative richness of the area’s natural resources and its abundance of
water, the Tonle Sap area remains one of Cambodia’s poorest when measured in
monetary terms.
The Tonle Sap Lake is known for its extraordinary flood pulse system with a
remarkable but nevertheless regular seasonal variation in the lake’s water volume and
level.  During the rainy season part of the Mekong’s floodwaters flow to the lake, and15
the lake’s surface area quadruples. An exceptional and highly productive flood plain
ecosystem has been formed: the Tonle Sap is believed to be among the world’s most
productive freshwater ecosystems.16
Water-related conflicts in the Tonle Sap
The case studies in this article describe conflicts in the Tonle Sap area related to flood
plains, agricultural land, and fisheries. These resources are in different ways enabled,
supported, and nurtured by water.
While the case studies focus on different aspects and dimensions of water-related
conflict, all of them are essentially about the inequality in access to and control over
natural resources and thus about different kinds of power structures. One way of
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Figure 1: Tonle Sap Lake and floodplains, together with private fishing lot
areas. Map by Matti Kummu.
viewing the different interests, power relations, and inequalities in resource allocation
is to look at them through the concept of structural violence. It implies that violence
can be built into the structures of a society, resulting in unequal life chances.  By17
discussing the mechanisms that marginalize the poor and deny them rights to use
natural resources to meet their subsistence needs, the case studies in this article
address important aspects of structural violence in relation to natural resource
management.18
Local, largely subsistence-based livelihood activities directly based on natural
resources are often the ones that degrade most with “development.”  Related19
governance challenges can thus be seen to reflect prevailing conceptualizations of
development and the consequent valuation of water and related resources. This comes
close to the discussion on symbolic violence that some see as an important dimension
in conflicts over natural resource use.  For example, most state-level actors seem to20
value modernist schemes such as large-scale irrigation and hydropower dam
construction more than traditional livelihoods. Also justifications for intervention –
e.g., in form of impact assessments – are often done by scientists and even the very
language they use excludes local communities from discussions that concerns their
future lives.
Case 1: Upstream development threatening flood plain ecosystem and livelihoods
This section is a case study about possible effects that upstream development in other
Mekong basin nations is likely to have on the ecosystem and livelihoods of the Tonle
Sap flood plain.  The case addresses the issue of different scales of water-related21
conflict and bridges the discussion between intra- and interstate conflict. The section
reviews regional cooperation mechanisms and discusses why transboundary impacts
– despite their negative effects and consequent tensions between the countries – are
unlikely to escalate to interstate conflict.
Transboundary impacts on the Tonle Sap flood plain
The flood plains surrounding the Tonle Sap support local people in many ways; a
large variety of flood plain products provide food, traditional medicine, firewood and
income for villagers, and flooded forests provide shelter for floating villages during
the floods. Flooded forests and shrubs also form a key element of Tonle Sap’s
ecosystem and play a critical role in sustaining its aquatic production.  However, the22
area of the flooded forest has been shrinking rapidly, e.g., due to firewood cutting and
of conversion of the flooded forests into agricultural land.23
Recent cumulative impact assessment studies indicate that a planned development
in the upstream parts of the Mekong River and its tributaries – most notably the
construction of large hydropower dams in China and Laos – are likely to cause an
increase in the dry-season water level in the lower parts of the Mekong, and
consequently in the Tonle Sap Lake.  The rise of dry-season water level means an2 4
extension of the permanent lake area and thus changes in the flood plain. The most
notable change would be permanent submersion, in essence destruction, of remarkable
areas of remaining flooded forests surrounding the lake.25
The reduction of flooded forest area would mean loss of livelihood sources for a
significant number of people, both due to loss of flooded forests per se and due to
consequent negative effects on aquatic production.  These are also likely to result in26
increased pressure on other natural resources as more people would rely on fewer
remaining resources. Thus, increased water development in other Mekong countries
would cause negative effects for the ecosystem and livelihoods of the Tonle Sap flood
plain and potentially fuel additional water- and resource-related conflict in the area.
Local impacts not visible in regional discussion
When considering possible transboundary impacts on Tonle Sap, it is important to
note that there exist regional cooperation organizations in the Mekong basin that aim
to facilitate discussion between riparian countries about impacts and trade-offs of
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water development. The best-known organizations are the Mekong River Commission
and the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Program.  But despite these regional27
cooperation mechanisms and despite an increasing number of studies indicating
adverse transboundary effects, Cambodia’s government seems not to be eager to bring
them up – at least not publicly.28
One of the main reasons for this appears to lie in increasing regional economic
cooperation, particularly China’s growing economic cooperation and assistance for
Cambodia. Apparently, the Cambodian government does not wish to risk its regional
economic cooperation by getting into difficult dialogue about possible transboundary
impacts with upstream countries. This stance has clearly strengthened over the past
few years,  concurrent to a remarkable increase in China’s economic and technical29
cooperation with Cambodia, for example in hydropower construction.30
This finding supports the view
that riparian countries prefer to
cooperate economically rather than
to get into substantial conflict over
water.  At the same time, however,31
the case also raises an important
point in the discussion of interstate
and intrastate water conflicts. While
it indeed seems possible that transboundary impacts between riparian countries can
result in increased water-related tensions within a country, the local level negative
impacts are not necessarily considered in the regional discussions between riparian
countries’ governments.
Case 2: Appropriation of agricultural land in the flood plain
Improving agricultural productivity is seen as crucial for Cambodia’s economic
growth.  This has its implications for the Tonle Sap area as well. Rapid agricultural32
development, including large-scale irrigation projects, is taking place in the upper
parts of the basin. Many of these projects are managed by governmental line agencies
and supported for instance by the Asian Development Bank. Also private initiatives
for agricultural development are occurring, but they are taking place mainly in Tonle
Sap’s flood plains. These new phenomena influence the availability of resources to
different user groups.
The Tonle Sap flood plains differ in many aspects from the surrounding uplands.
Traditionally, large parts of the flood plains – particularly those close to the lake that
are submerged for longer periods of time – have not been under clear ownership or
cultivation, but have been used for various purposes.  Many are so-called communal33
areas, their use being based on customary user rights without efficient control or
“domestication” by government. The drive for agricultural production along with
improved accessibility of the Tonle Sap area  and increased land value has led private34
investors – often belonging to the country’s elite with connections to investors
elsewhere in Southeast Asia – to see the flood plain areas as profitable targets for
investment. This has brought its own challenges and increased tensions in the area.
Emerging private irrigation areas in the flood plains
The increased flow of investments to Tonle Sap’s flood plains has materialized in the
form of a rapid expansion of irrigated agriculture and related structures such as large
embankments and reservoirs. These are intended primarily for profitable dry-season
rice cultivation.  Concessions for these private initiatives are usually granted by35
provincial or central government, but the granting procedures seem often dubious and
many – including government officials – claim that a significant proportion of new
irrigation areas and structures are in fact illegal.36
The emergence of private irrigation areas in the Tonle Sap flood plain has meant
that many local communes have lost areas that they have traditionally used, e.g., for
floating rice cultivation and as grazing grounds for cattle, thus undermining local
customary rights. As these areas are usually not officially titled to villagers, the
villagers have weak possibilities to influence the construction of new structures and
have not even been able to get proper compensation for their losses. Moreover, our
field surveys indicate that private concessionaires plan to charge local farmers for
irrigation water from their reservoirs, and this has caused additional tensions.37
Private irrigation areas have also faced resistance. Some of the planned irrigation
development projects in different parts of the flood plain have been halted due to
increased pressure from local people and NGOs.  In addition, some provincial38
agencies have brought up problems related to the new irrigation projects, including
their possible negative impacts on fisheries as well as on local livelihoods.  Thus,39
even though the emerging development is basically supported by central and
provincial governments, and concession rights were guaranteed by government
officials, these officials are not unanimous about the legitimacy of the land
appropriation process.
These differing views of government officials are related to the line agencies’
confusion about whom the responsibility for the management and development of the
flood plain areas actually belongs to.  The confusion is linked with existing40
institutional rivalries between different ministries over the responsibility – and
resources – for agricultural development.  Different line agencies also see the4 1
possible impacts of the private irrigation development differently: as none of the
private irrigation structures include a proper impact assessment process, the irrigation
structures’ impacts, e.g., to the fisheries has therefore not been appropriately assessed.
The conflict over the use and control of flood plain areas is thus closely linked
with the broader governance context and its ambiguities. The roots for the conflict can
also be seen in the vagueness of the ownership of flood plain land areas that have
traditionally been under community user rights but are now differently recognized by
While adverse transboundary impacts
among riparian states can result in
water-related intrastate tensions, local-
level adverse effects are not necessarily
considered in interstate discussions.
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different parties.
Case 3: Practices of exclusion in Tonle Sap fisheries
Fish forms the main source of income and food particularly to the poorest and most
vulnerable groups of people in Cambodia.  Well-functioning and equal fisheries4 2
management would therefore be crucial for balanced development of the country.
Unfortunately this is not the case. Cambodia’s fisheries management – like the
management of many of its other resources – is dominated by weak implementation
of policies, lack of accountability, and non-transparent and unjust practices.43
Accordingly, different kinds of conflicts related to fishing and particularly to access
to and control over different fishing areas exist, two of which are presented in this
section.44
Conflicts with private fishing lots
Cambodia’s fisheries management is marked by appropriations and exclusions from
access of the local communities. The epitome of this is the operation of large-scale,
commercial fisheries that is based on so-called fishing lot system. Fishing lots are
geographical concessions auctioned to the highest bidder for a certain period, usually
two years. The lots include lake areas, rivers, ponds, and inundated forest and are
typically located in the most productive fishing areas. The owner of the fishing lot has
an exclusive right to harvest fish from the lot, to sublease parts of the lots, and to keep
everyone else out from the lot area.45
The fishing lots are allowed to operate only during the most important fishing
season which, in theory, leaves lots accessible for small-scale subsistence fishing for
the rest of the year. But many lot owners limit the access to lots throughout the year,
and some lots have also extended their areas to community fishing areas, open access
areas, and fish conservation zones, creating thus both geographical and temporal
conflicts over access to fishing areas. In short, the system excludes most people from
the most productive fishing areas during the most productive fishing season.46
It is therefore no surprise that the fishing lot system has created serious tensions
and even armed conflict between local villagers and fishing lot owners and their
guards. Tensions were soaring at the turn of the millennium, when villagers around
the Tonle Sap started to protest more loudly against the exclusionary fishing lot
system, the extended boundaries of lot areas, and government’s inability to respond
to the conflict.  Responding to the accumulation of fisheries conflict, the government47
proclaimed in 2001 radical and sudden changes to the country’s fisheries
management. Half of the total area of the private fishing lots was changed to public
fishing lots open for community fisheries. This shift aimed to improve peoples’ food
security and to ease the growing tensions between local people and fishing lot owners.
Conflicting interests in community
fisheries
The fisheries reform of 2001
experienced certain setbacks and
some believe that the tensions just
took different forms.  Although the48
re lease  o f more  a reas fo r
community fishing was overall a
positive shift and eased tensions between fishers and fishing lot owners, management
of community fishing areas has turned out to be challenging.  Among the main49
reasons for these challenges is that the institutional arrangements of community
fisheries seem often to ignore the heterogeneity of local communities and the
complexity of local power structures.50
The underlying assumptions for the common ethos of community-based fisheries
management are often unrealistic; they assume that all local fishers – including larger
scale fishers – would easily become environmental “shepherds” and agree to limit
their activities to subsistence levels. This points toward government’s and donors’
lack of sensitivity to resource users’ own perceptions on their resource use as well as
to the fact that fishing communities consist of fishers with different scales of
activities. An additional challenge for community management is that fish are
commonly seen as a commodity by the fishers, not least because of the long moral
influence of the private lot system. Tonle Sap is thus rather special in that the
development of new institutional arrangements does not originate from the “tragedy
of open access,” but rather from the “tragedy of privatization.”
At the same time, the continued operation of private fishing lots  seriously51
undermines the legitimacy of regulatory measures in community fishing areas and
discourages compliance with law. Findings from our field surveys indicate that many
villagers saw the community fisheries’ regulations that restrict villagers’ fishing to
subsistence levels hard to justify when compared to the liberties given to private
fishing lot owners. This relates to broader questions about the context of and values
behind current fisheries governance: who has the right to consider fish a commodity
and who is to be restricted to subsistence fishing, and do local fishers have rights to
defend their livelihood or just rights to defend subsistence fishing that they are by law
restricted to?
Another emerging difficulty in the community fisheries is so-called elite capture.
There naturally exist various power relations and interests within a fishing community
that are then combined with outside interests. As a result, those with a strong asset
base and high social and political capital dominate easily the agenda and activities of
the community fisheries. Indeed, findings from our field surveys indicate that many
of the current community fisheries management systems in the areas with high prior
heterogeneity among the local fishers have failed to take the local power structures
The emergence of private irrigation
areas in the Tonle Sap flood plain has
led many local communes to lose areas
that they have traditionally used, for
example, for floating-rice cultivation
and as grazing grounds for cattle.
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properly into account, and are
actually maintaining existing local
power imbalances.
The wealthier groups in our
survey villages were significantly
m o r e  r e p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h e
m a n a g e m e n t  o f  c o m m u ni ty
fisheries, capturing the best fishing
grounds, and at the same time
restricting the access of poorer
groups – even when official rules
and regulations aim to reduce these
kinds of exclusive practices. The
situation is thus paradoxical: an institutional arrangement designed for subsistence
fishers has turned into one that excludes them, and instead provides a negotiation
ground for medium or larger-scale fishers as well as a means to control the activities
of the poorer ones.
The lack of cultural sensitivity of donor-driven reforms can be seen as one issue
explaining this paradox. W hile decentralized natural resource management aims at
more equal allocation of benefits from natural resources, democratic communicative
practices might not always reduce local power imbalances, although they might take
new forms. Southeast Asian world views are often considered to favor harmony over
open discussion that could bring up conflict-prone topics. Although this is naturally
a simplification, it has discovered that the drive toward greater participation indeed
leaves space for so-called silent conflicts, as communicative ideals of participation fail
to address the “dark side” of power and politicking within planning institutions,
planning practice, communication, and social relations.  Silent conflict thus52
potentially results in continuities of local repressive structures.53
Discussion: the different dimensions of water-related conflicts
We analyzed characteristics of water-related conflicts in three case studies from
Cambodia’s Tonle Sap Lake focusing on flood plains, agricultural land, and fisheries.
The cases encompass different dimensions and aspects of water-related conflicts.
The case study on fisheries (case 3) focused on conflicts between fishers and on
the role of fisheries management in those conflicts. Until the fisheries reform of 2001,
Cambodia’s fisheries management was structurally violent toward local fishers in that
private fishing lots excluded local communities from most of the major fishing areas.
Although these excluding practices still exist, the situation has improved and many
of the fishing areas have been shifted to fall under local community management.
Consequently, one interesting finding from the fisheries case is that conflicts should
not be seen only in a negative light, but may also be seen as a driver for change. As
the fisheries reform showed, the accumulating resistance of local fishing communities
that conflicted openly with private fishing concessions was the driver for development
of more equal laws, rules, and regulations in fisheries management, thus reducing
potential future conflicts. Conflict may thus play a constructive role in facilitating
social and economic transformation as well as in shaping social relations and power
structures.54
Fisheries reform, however, did not come without challenges. One difficulty in this
otherwise positive reform was that it was done in a hasty manner without sufficient
commitment from state actors and proper involvement of the local level. In addition,
the reform was greatly influenced by the donor community. A danger with initiatives
driven by the donor community is that the general policies they imply are often rather
detached from local reality and therefore likely to cause unintended and undesirable
results.  As demonstrated by the fisheries case, if new institutional and participatory55
arrangements are designed without proper understanding of local realities and
sociopolitical structures, they are – despite their good intentions – likely to result in
participatory processes that merely reproduce dominant power structures.
The case study on land appropriations in the flood plains (case 2) revealed a
situation where traditional use of a resource is being undermined by powerful groups.
The combination of increased accessibility to the flood plains and unclear legal status
of the flood plains areas have left these areas exposed to uncontrolled privatization
and resulted in conflicts between local communes and outside appropriators and
private investors. The case revealed that formal rules and regulations do not properly
recognize local communities’ customary user rights – that have existed as practical
norms for generations – to utilize agricultural land.
Comparison of these two cases reveals an interesting difference: whereas the flood
plains areas are increasingly being transformed from common to private areas, the
fishing domains are being reconverted from private concessions to community user
groups. Different water-related resources have different histories and are perceived
differently by local users. Consequently, without sensitivity to the resource users’ own
perceptions on their resource use, attempts to understand tensions related to resource
use are likely to fail. Local communities are not homogenous entities; they entail
different user groups with differing perceptions on the resources they use.
While the cases on fisheries and agricultural land focused on conflicts within the
Tonle Sap area, case 1 elaborated on possible adverse transboundary impacts from
upstream Mekong countries. The case also addressed the diverse conceptualizations
of development and differing values attached to natural resources by actors in
different levels and scales. The discussion on why water-related conflicts are unlikely
to scale up to the regional level indicated that national decisionmakers seem not to be
aware of – or are even ignorant toward – concerns about transboundary impacts at the
local level. The political elites, irrespective of their country, seem to have similar
modernization aspirations and common economic interests, and they are thus more
likely to find consensus than to end up in serious conflict over water development in
The drive toward greater participation
leaves space for silent conflicts, as
communicative ideals of participation
fail to address the “dark side” of power
and politicking within planning
institutions, planning practice,
communication, and social relations.
Silent conflict thus potentially results
in continuities of local repressive
structures.
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1. See, e.g., Ohlsson (1999); Haftendorn (2000); Postel and Wolf (2001); Watkins and
Berntell (2006).
2. For instance, Shiva (2002).
3. It has been suggested that Cambodia has one of the highest natural resource
availability per capita in Asia (Kurien, et al., 2006; World Bank, 2004), but there
seems not to be a proper study on this.
4. World Bank (2006a).
5. This decline is partly due to natural disasters, i.e., drought and high floods during
the past few years. See NIS (2004). In these statistics the agricultural sector includes
also fishing and forestry.
6. Le Billon (2007).
7. Öjendal and Sedara (2006). It is important to note that the sociopolitical structures
usually considered as obstacles for democracy, such as patron-client relations and
authoritarianism, are not as static as is often thought.
the basin. Discussion about interstate water conflict is thus not likely to be meaningful
in the Mekong basin. However, this conclusion shows only one side of the coin as at
the same time the seemingly fluent regional cooperation seems to prevent actual
discussion about negative transboundary impacts at the local level.
This finding relates to James C. Scott’s idea on state simplifications.  The trade-56
offs between livelihood sources look different when viewed from the state rather than
the local level. Calculations based on abstract forms of knowledge and information
render livelihood issues of farmers and fishers living around the Tonle Sap into
estimations of general productivity and profitability, ignoring political and moral
dimensions of the trade-offs. The trade-offs are usually made on issues that many
locals could not consider calculable or comparable. Thus, a common characteristic for
all three cases is found to be related to unequal power structures and mechanisms of
marginalization within and between the different scales.
Conclusion: the importance of the governance context
The three case studies indicate how diverse and multidimensional water-related
tensions and conflicts are in the context of the Tonle Sap. It becomes obvious that
water-related conflicts are rarely solely about water and its scarcity (or abundance),
but that access to and control over water and related resources are actually often more
dominant reasons for water-related conflicts.
Water-related conflicts cannot thus be linked to increased resource scarcity alone,
but also – and perhaps mainly – to unequal distribution of water and related resources.
Consequently, we see that the discussion on water conflicts should focus much more
on the mechanisms of allocation of water and related resources as well as on formal
and informal power structures shaping these mechanisms. In addition, different
valuations attached to the resources as well as the political and historical context
where they prevail have a strong influence on tensions over resource use.
Consequently, water-related conflicts should always be examined in a broader
context, with special attention to existing power structures both at local and higher –
national and regional – levels. These findings reinforce many other studies on conflict
and natural resources.57
Notes
Marko Keskinen is a researcher and Ph.D. candidate at the Water Resources
Laboratory of Helsinki University of Technology, Finland. His research focuses on
the interactions between water and society as well as on multi- and cross-disciplinary
approaches of water management. He may be reached at keskinen@iki.fi. Mira
Käkönen is a master’s degree student at the Department of Sociology in the
University of Helsinki with experience in natural resource management-related
projects in the Mekong region. Her research interests are in power and knowledge
relations and changes in expertise in
environment and development
i s su e s .  P r o m  T o la  i s  a n
ind ep e n d e n t  r e se a rche r  and
consultant from Phnom Penh,
Cambodia. He has long experience
in natural resource management and
participatory approaches. Olli Varis
is a senior researcher at the Water Resources Laboratory of Helsinki University of
Technology and has broad, interdisciplinary experiences on water, environment, and
development research and consultation. He is a frequently used expert by various
U.N. and other international organizations and is the author of over 300 scientific
papers. We are grateful for comments and support provided by numerous colleagues
and fellow researchers in the Mekong region. Special thanks are due to Matti Kummu,
Juha Sarkkula, Jorma Koponen, and Professor Pertti Vakkilainen as well as to our
Cambodian colleagues Yim Sambo and Suong Leakhena who were instrumental in
facilitating the field surveys. For fluent collaboration and inspiring discussions we
also thank Mak Sithirith, Dil Bahadur Rahut, Blake Ratner, and Babette Resurreccion.
Water-related conflicts cannot be
linked to increased resource scarcity
alone, but also – and perhaps mainly –
to unequal distribution of water and
related resources.
The Economics of Peace and Security Journal, ISSN 1749-852X Keskinen et al., Cambodia’s Tonle Sap Lake     p. 55
© www.epsjournal.org.uk – Vol. 2, No. 2 (2007)
8. Although the estimated poverty incidence in Cambodia fell from 47 percent to 35
percent from 1994 to 2004, per capita consumption among the poorest fifth of the
population rose by only 8 percent, compared to 45 percent among the richest fifth.
The Gini coefficient (measuring inequality in the income distribution) grew from 0.35
in 1994 to 0.40 in 2004. Poverty sunk much faster in urban than in rural areas, and the
inequalities grew particularly in rural areas (World Bank, 2006b).
9. World Bank (2004, 2006a).
10. Le Billon (2000, 2007); Tarr (2003).
11. World Bank (2006b, p. 131).
12. There naturally are a variety of practical norms when implementing these policies.
For example, decentralization and its importance might be differently interpreted by
different groups. The on-going decentralization process would probably not have
taken place if it had not been interpreted by the ruling party as a new source of means
to gain popularity and legitimacy. Thus decentralization has actually not been





16. However, as noted by Lamberts (2006), there is currently very little information
available on the actual ecosystem productivity of the Tonle Sap, and the available data
is particularly ambiguous on fisheries.
17. See Galtung (1969); Farmer (1997). According to Galtung (1969, p. 168),
structural violence refers to the mechanisms of exclusion and inequality and poverty
that constrain the physical and mental capacities of the poor and denies them a decent
life. Galtung sees violence consisting of factors that “cause people’s actual physical
and mental realizations to be below their potential realizations.”
18. Exclusory mechanisms are partly based on ethnicity; in particular, Cambodia’s
Vietnamese minority is regularly deprived of basic rights such as land ownership.
They are also often excluded from official statistics and enumerations, and it is
therefore impossible to give their exact number. However, they are particularly
numerous in the floating villages of the Tonle Sap, and it has been estimated that at
least 14 percent of the population (around 12,000 people) in those villages would be
ethnic Vietnamese (Keskinen, 2003).
19. Bryant and Bailey (1997).
20. For example, Peluso and Watts (2001).
21. In addition to the potential transboundary impacts discussed in this section, other
kinds of transboundary impacts occur in the Mekong basin. For instance, Cambodia
has suffered from Vietnam’s water development in different ways. The Vietnamese
flood protection structures along the Cambodian border (built to reduce flood damages
on the Vietnamese side) have resulted in increased flooding in Cambodia (Bown,
2003).  Also, the Mekong’s tributaries in the Vietnamese Central Highlands have been
a site for increased irrigation abstractions, deforestation, and dam construction that
have had adverse effects on the Cambodian side. Perhaps the best-known case is the
construction of Yali Falls Dam that has caused loss of river-bank agricultural areas,
increased erosion, and losses for fisheries on the Cambodian side of the Se San River
(Baird and Mean, 2005).
22. Kummu, et al. (2007); Evans, et al. (2004).
23. Evans, et al. (2004) estimate that between 1973 and 1997 the flooded forest cover
in the Tonle Sap area has reduced over 50 percent. See Evans, et al. (2004); Degen,
et al. (2000). The conversion of flooded forests into agricultural land has also induced
conflicts between farmers and fishers. While fishers (including fishing lot owners)
want to preserve the flooded forest to sustain Tonle Sap’s high fish production,
farmers – some of whom seem to be shifting from fishing to farming due to reduced
fish catch – want to convert the forest areas to agricultural land.
24. Kummu, et al. (2007).
25. Kummu (2007) estimates that a 30 cm increase in Tonle Sap’s dry-season water
level would permanently submerge up to one third of the remaining flooded forest
area.
26. Although the Tonle Sap area’s population is concentrated on the upper fringes of
the flood plain, an estimated over 140,000 people live in the actual flood plains, i.e.,
in the area that is submerged practically every year (area between 0m and 8m above
sea level). See Keskinen (2006).
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27. The Mekong River Commission (MRC) focuses on water management, but only
four of the six downstream countries are members (Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and
Vietnam; but not China and Burma/Myanmar). The GMS Program has all six Mekong
countries as it members and it focuses on economic and infrastructure development,
but some environmental and water issues are also on its agenda.
28. Despite the MRC’s commonly agreed rules of equitable utilization of the
Mekong’s waters, local livelihoods are still in various ways threatened by water
development in the basin. This paradox can be understood partly through the state-
centerd structure of the regional organizations. As noted by Fox and Sneddon (2004)
for example, the MRC as an inter-governmental organization seems to dismiss that
the river is a host of complex socioecological dynamics, and instead sees it
simplistically as a watercourse where water is allocated in equal quantities among the
countries.
29. In 2003 Cambodian prime minister Hun Sen said in a speech that “... the upstream
countries' projects in the Mekong River, namely the continued dam constructions and
commercial navigation plan, have become a major concern for the downstream
countries including Cambodia,” and he was particularly concerned about the negative
impacts to the Tonle Sap (Cambodia New Vision, 2003). Two years later, just before
heading to the Second GMS Summit in China, Hun Sen was quoted saying that he
believes hydropower dams built by upstream countries will pose “no problems” to
Cambodia, and he criticized that people who are claiming otherwise just want to
undermine the unity among the riparian countries (People’s Daily Online, 2005). At
the same time China’s economic assistance to Cambodia has increased remarkably
(Keskinen, et al., 2007).
30. Keskinen, et al. (2007).
31. See, e.g., Pryor (2007).
32. World Bank (2006b).
33. Land title remains unclear in most areas of Cambodia.
34. National roads surrounding the flood plains as well as many smaller rural roads
have during the past years been improved remarkably.
35. For example, Evans, et al. (2005) note that at least 15-20 dams/embankments for
dry-season rice cultivation have been built in the 91.5 km  study area in Kampong2
Thom since 2003. These structures capture receding flood waters, are long (typically
extending 0.5-2 km), and can each irrigate hundreds of hectares.
36. For example, in Kampong Thom province, an interviewed provincial officer
estimated that up to half of the private irrigation areas in the province would be
illegally built.
37. Field surveys were carried out in fall 2006 by Mira Käkönen, together with Yim
Sambo, Suong Leakhena, and Marko Keskinen, in three different locations around the
Tonle Sap Lake, adjacent to the surveys of the so-called Built Structures Project.
38. Findings from our field surveys indicate that, e.g., in Battambang province the
development of approximately 6,450 hectares of land bought/leased by CityMart
company is at a standstill due the strong opposition of local farmers and NGOs who
criticize that the project acquired the land areas illegally.
39. Our field surveys indicate that, e.g., in Kampong Thom the provincial departments
of agriculture and fishery are addressing the problems related to private irrigation
structures and are demanding removal of some of the new structures.
40. The ministries involved include, e.g., the Ministry of Water Resources and
Meteorology and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries. While the latter
seems to prefer more diversified and smaller-scale agricultural development, the
former is keener to plan and build large-scale irrigation schemes and has been more
active in promoting private land concession around the lake.
41. As pointed out by Ratner, et al. (2004), the confusion and even institutional
rivalries over the formal division of authority in natural resource management is quite
common in the case of wetlands due to its ambiguous nature.
42. Sithirith and Grundy-Warr (2007); Navy, et al. (2006); McKenney and Tola
(2002).
43. Ratner (2006); Salayo, et al. (2006).
44. Salayo, et al. (2006) and Sithirith and Grundy-Warr (2007) recognize five
different kinds of fishing-related conflicts in Tonle Sap, including, e.g., those between
fishers and other users of aquatic resources (e.g., lowland farmers) as well as with
“outsiders” migrating seasonally to the lake and its flood plain to fish. We focus here
only on conflict among fishers and also leave out ethnic aspects (particularly with
ethnic Vietnamese) that include some serious tensions as well.
45. Actually a lessee, but the term “lot owner” is much more commonly used,
reflecting the dominance of the lessee over the fishing lot area.
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46. In addition, there have been conflicts between fishing lot owners and farmers over
water use rights, related mainly to diverting and storing flood waters, and
consequently fish (Degen, et al., 2000).
47. For more information on this topic, see, e.g., Resurreccion (2006); Sina (2003);
Bonheur (2002); NGO Forum (2000); Degen, et al. (2000).
48. McKenney and Tola (2002); Bonheur (2002); Ratner (2006).
49. However, only a part of the released fishing lots is currently under community
management, with the rest being so-called open access fishing areas (McKenney and
Tola, 2002). As noted by Degen, et al. (2000), the notion of open access is erroneous
as a majority of these areas are actually under informal ownership and management
arrangements, often imposed by lot owners and powerful local elite and excluding the
poorer subsistence fishers. It would thus be perhaps better to refer, e.g., to the concept
of common pool resources instead of open access resources (cf., Ostrom, 1990).
50. For innovative analysis on formal and informal power structures in Tonle Sap's
community fisheries, and particularly on the challenges of women’s participation in
it, see Resurreccion (2006).
51. Even after fisheries reform, half of the private fishing lots continue their operation
and apply significantly larger scale – and often illegal – fishing methods compared to
the methods allowed for subsistence fishing. In the Tonle Sap Area 53.4 percent of
the lot areas prior to 2001 are still under private fishing lot system. In Battambang and
Kampong Chnang provinces – where many of the most productive fishing areas are
located – this figure is over 70 percent (McKenney and Tola, 2002). Consequently,
an additional disincentive for participation in community fisheries is that the fisheries’
production in several new community fishing areas is fairly low.
52. Tam (2006).
53. This conclusion should not be interpreted simply as a lack of capacity for
collective action in Cambodian communities. Spontaneous local activities and
initiatives challenging authoritarian structures have followed from decentralization in
Cambodia, also in the management of natural resources (Middleton and Tola, 2007).
The challenge is that the community fisheries reform was initiated in a top-down
manner and the responsibility does not therefore actually lie at the local level. The
new local community fisheries can work meaningfully only if they are truly supported
by a broader governance context that values equitable resource allocation. Fishers in
our surveys often expressed frustration with the lack of attention and support from
higher level authorities and with the reluctance of authorities to properly control
private lots as well as the actions of local fisher elites in community fishing areas.
54. Cf. Upreti (2001).
55. More general discussion on current water policies in the Mekong region and their
mismatches with local realities can be found, e.g., in Molle (2005).
56. Scott (1998).
57. See, e.g., Bryant and Bailey (1997); Peluso and Watts (2001); Upreti (2001).
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